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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the effects of the United States’ policy of the second front in 
the global war on terrorism (GWOT) on the conflict in the southern Philippines. The 
policy’s reliance on intervention measures that are both “preemptive” and “direct” by 
military means, echoes Mearsheimer's argument that "simply put, great powers are 
primed for offense." The question may be asked: how effective is the second front policy 
in terms of resolving the conflict?  
The ongoing violence in the southern Philippines, since the policy’s inception in 
early 2002, suggests its ineffectiveness in addressing the root causes of the conflict. This 
thesis investigates the history of the Moro and the Mindanao conflict to determine the 
root causes of the conflicts. On the foundation of the existing theory of conflict 
resolution, the thesis then performs an analysis of the past peace processes. Following the 
analysis are the recommendations for future policy and peace negotiations: A 
comprehensive peace policy that clearly distinguishes armed terrorists from Islamic 
separatists with legitimate political grievances and applies direct and indirect approaches 
accordingly. For future peace negotiations, the thesis recommends that both the GRP and 
the MILF to concentrate their efforts on building trust and consensus at all levels of 
society. The thesis concludes with recommendations on future studies.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes the effects of the United States’ policy of the second front in 
the global war on terrorism (GWOT) on the conflict in the southern Philippines. The 
policy’s reliance on intervention measures that are both “preemptive” and “direct” by 
military means echoes Mearsheimer's argument that "simply put, great powers are primed 
for offense." The question may be asked: how effective is the second front policy in 
terms of resolving the conflict?  
The ongoing violence in the southern Philippines since the policy’s inception in 
early 2002 suggests its ineffectiveness in addressing the root causes of the conflict. This 
thesis conducts an investigation to identify the root causes of the conflict followed by a 
policy analysis to assess the policy’s effectiveness in addressing them. Recommendations 
for policy adjustments and further studies follow the analysis.  
B.  IMPORTANCE 
As one of the poorest and most isolated regions in the world, the southern 
Philippines possess all of the prerequisites that transnational terrorist organizations desire 
to gain a strong foothold. Transnational terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), have known ties to Islamic insurgencies in the Philippines.1 In 
fact, such groups have been using remote parts of the southern Philippines as bases to 
conduct training and operations. Past attempts by the Government of the Philippines 
(GRP) to improve security have been mired in the ongoing violence of the Islamic 
insurgencies. 
As a major non-NATO U.S. ally in Southeast Asia, it is extremely important for 
the Philippines to resolve all domestic security issues that contribute to the instability of 
the country. The resolution of domestic issues through peaceful means that satisfy all 
actors, will strengthen the legitimacy of the GRP and contribute to a lasting peace. 
                                                 
1 JI is known to have financial and operational ties to regional and transnational terrorist organizations 
such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Al-Qaeda. 
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Approaches other than kinetic ones may be far more effective in dealing with the 
root of a conflict than the kinetic approach alone. Therefore, creating an overarching 
conflict resolution policy that addresses the root causes, within the context of the local 
sociopolitical system, will increase the chances of resolving a conflict in a manner that 
satisfies all involved actors. To date, no studies examine how U.S. foreign policy can deal 
with transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines by promoting an overarching conflict 
resolution that addresses the root of the conflict. This thesis intends to fill this gap in the 
existing literature. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The importance of identifying the root causes of a conflict is essential in assessing 
the situation and in formulating an effective policy. The popular view of the Islamic 
insurgency in the southern Philippines is that it is either ethnically or religiously charged. 
By focusing on the ongoing violence, the underlying causes of the conflict can simply be 
overlooked. This myopic view might prevent an understanding of the source of the 
region’s tension.2 As the second-oldest conflict in human history, historical grievances 
are well hidden by the participating actors behind constantly evolving agendas.3 
Therefore, in order to successfully locate and isolate the root causes of a conflict in the 
southern Philippines, the history of the Moro, the Muslim Filipinos, must be carefully 
examined. 
Hypothesis 1: Ethnic or religious grievances are less likely to be the root causes of 
the conflict than is commonly believed. 
A brief survey of the literature reveals that the Moros view the source of the 
conflict as their political marginalization by the Christian majority Filipino regime, as 
well as disputes over their ancestral lands. 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Teaching between the Cross and the Crescent Moon: Islamic Identity, 
Postcoloniality, and Public Education in the Southern Philippines," Comparative Education Review 47, no. 
4 (2003): 468. 
3 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Mary P. Judd,  World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 
The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend (Washington, D.C: 
Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, 
World Bank, 2005), 1. 
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Hypothesis 2: Grievances over land loss and political marginalization are likely to 
be the root causes of the conflict. 
The Philippine government is characterized by a weak central administration, 
which means that the directives issued might not be implemented as intended. The fact 
that the Philippines is a former U.S. colony further complicates domestic issues. Any 
intervention by the United States, or by any other country for that matter, might signal a 
weak legitimacy of the GRP. This perception can be used by insurgents to further weaken 
the legitimacy of the government and to strengthen their own positions.4 
Hypothesis 3: Direct intervention is not likely to produce a successful resolution 
to the insurgency because it does not address the root causes of the conflict. 
An indirect intervention, with the GRP in charge and the United States as a 
cooperating partner, might help to elevate the legitimacy of the GRP and further 
strengthen its position in the conflict. A policy that effectively addresses the underlying 
causes will not only bring the conflict to an end but will also serve to minimize the risk of 
a renewed conflict in the near future.5 
Hypothesis 4: Indirect intervention that effectively addresses the root causes with 
regard to the Philippines’ domestic sociopolitical climate is most likely to produce a 
resolution that satisfies all actors. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will employ a case-study method of the Muslim insurgency in the 
southern Philippines, with a qualitative analysis that assesses the effectiveness of the 
second front policy. The thesis will rely on secondary sources, which consist of books 
and reviewed scholarly journal articles, and may be supplemented by interviews of 
subject experts, both inside and outside the Naval Postgraduate School. 
                                                 
4 Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, "Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia," The 
Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring, 2002): 165-166. 
5 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "Post-Conflict Risks," Journal of Peace Research 
45, no. 4 (July 1, 2008): 461. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
There are four chapters in this thesis. Chapter I consists of a discussion of the 
background, the research question, the significance of the problem, the research methods, 
and the existing literature. Chapters II is a narrative history of the Moro people, a 
discussion of other actors that are involved, and a description of attempted peace 
negotiations aimed at ending the Mindanao Conflict.  
Chapter III analyzes the U.S. policy of the second front in the GWOT for its 
effectiveness in terms of direct and pre-emptive military strategy. The possible 
implications of the policy’s success or failure for the Philippines is also discussed. 
Chapter IV discusses possible ways that the Mindanao conflict can be resolved 
peacefully. The final chapter consists of recommendations on future policy and peace 
negotiations and further studies.   
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II. THE MINDANAO CONFLICT AND PEACE PROCESSES 
A.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The Republic of the Philippines has been shaped by two different colonial 
experiences, first by the Spanish and later by the Americans. Prior to the arrival of 
Americans at the end of the 1890s, the Spanish had colonized and influenced the 
Philippines for over three centuries. Spanish efforts to Christianize the Filipinos had 
resulted in the Philippines as the only country in all of Southeast Asia with a Christian 
majority population. However, the people who lived in the southern parts of the 
Philippines, had stubbornly resisted the Spanish efforts to Christianize them. 
The origin of the name “Moro” can be traced back to the Spanish term “Moor,” 
which was applied to their Muslim enemy. Due to the diversity of the indigenous people 
in the southern Philippines, the Spanish Jesuits in the nineteenth century found it easier to 
group them collectively by the one thing they all had in common: the religion of Islam.6 
The Western idea of equating Christianity with civilization had a profound impact on the 
Moros being marginalized socially, politically, and economically.7 The marginalization 
of the Moro continues today and is a major source of mistrust and grievances.   
1. Emergence of Moro Community 
According to Yegar, Muslim traders began setting up permanent settlements in 
the coastal area in the vicinity of the city of Jolo, where trade routes between Southeast 
Asian countries crossed. The earliest of these settlements can be traced back to the end of 
the thirteenth century. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, Islam was well 
established in the Sulu Archipelago. Gaining momentum from the missionaries from 
 
 
                                                 
6 Wayne W. Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province: Wood, Bliss, and Pershing in the Southern 
Philippines, 1903-1913” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1975), 29. 
7 Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 122. 
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India and southern China, Islam spread throughout the Malay Archipelago along the trade 
routes. This process continued inland until most of the inhabitants throughout the 
archipelago were converted to Islam.8 
 
Figure 1.   Southeast Asia.9 
The Islamization of Lanao and Cotabato began when Muslim traders and 
missionaries reached southern Mindanao towards the end of the fifteenth century. Not all 
Islamization processes took place peacefully. The expansion of Islam to northern islands, 
in particular, was met with Spanish resistance in the sixteenth century.10 By the time the 
Spaniards arrived in the northern islands in 1565, Islamization was well underway in 
                                                 
8 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 185. 
9 From Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook;” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html.  
10 Yegar, 186. 
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Luzon. However, shortly after their arrival, the Spaniards forcibly removed the Muslim 
sultan, Raja Suleiman, from the region of Manila, effectively ending the expansion of 
Islam further north.11 
 
Figure 2.   Islands of the Republic of the Philippines.12 
The largest concentration of the Muslim population in the southern Philippines 
can be found on the islands of Sulu and Mindanao, among the districts of Lanao, 
Cotabato, Davao, Basilan, and Balabac. In contrast to the ethnically homogeneous 
Muslim populations of Thailand and Burma, the Muslims of the southern Philippines are 
heterogeneous. Depending on the estimates, the number of ethnic-language groups within 
the Muslim population varies anywhere from six to thirteen. These groups do not share a 
                                                 
11 Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: Philippines Press, 1973); Ibid., The 
Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., 
The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 2–5; Yegar, 186. 
12 From CIA World Factbook. 
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common language and may not be geographically concentrated into a particular location. 
There are regions where two or more groups are co-located and interact socially and 
economically.13 
Differences can be seen in their interpretation of religion as well. Groups vary in 
terms of Islamic orthodoxy in their adherence to religious customs and practices.14 Once 
the veil of Islam is lifted, the difference between the groups in terms of their adherence to 
traditional cultures and ways of life becomes apparent. In this respect, Islam can be 
considered the one factor uniting the different communities in the southern Philippines. 
2. The Moros as Part of the Global Islamic Community 
The diversity among the Muslim communities in the southern Philippines can be 
misleading. At a glance, the communities seem to have little in common. However, there 
is a definite commonality among them. It is Islam as a religion as well as a way of life. 
What began several centuries ago as Islamization by Muslim traders and missionaries had 
become the major force behind dramatic transformations in the Moros’ way of life. 
However, not all previously held beliefs disappeared altogether. Some had found a way 
to become an integral part of the Moro’s interpretation of Islam.15   
As part of the Islamization process, the Muslim traders and missionaries brought 
with them a new culture, language, moral and ethical standards, and laws. The Arabic 
alphabet was adopted for writing. The Islamic calendar was introduced. The spoken 
Arabic language was also adopted for religious and theological purposes. The Moros 
began learning the Arabic language in order to study the Koran and participate in 
religious rituals and ceremonies. Arabic literature was also introduced and Arab words 
found their place among the Moro language. At the same time, the Malay language 
became the standard for commercially related matters.16   
                                                 
13 Yegar, 186. 
14 Ibid., 186–187. 
15 Najeeb M. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 
1976), 67; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 4, 10, 15-16; Majul, The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical 
Perspective in The Muslim Filipinos, 1–12. 
16 Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion, 67; Majul, Muslim Filipinos, 4, 10, 15–16;  
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With the advent of Islam and culture, the Moros became conscious of their 
presence as part of a much larger community, first with the Malay world then with the 
entire Muslim community. This development was significant in the history of the Moro. 
These groups of Moros with diverse backgrounds began identifying themselves as 
Muslims and with Muslims from other parts of the world. The Moros then developed a 
sense of belonging to a much wider Islamic community, also known as Dar al-Islam. 
Islam’s long and glorious history soon became a source of pride for the Moros. More 
importantly, the Moros developed their own sense of history and identified themselves as 
people of history.17 
3. Origin of Hostilities 
The Moros’ development of a sense of community with the rest of the Islamic 
world was significant, both in the history of the Moro and in their struggles. Majul 
describes the strong Muslim sense of community as follows:   
First of all, Muslims have a high sense of community….The overriding 
conviction in Islam is that all Muslims are brothers. It is this sense of 
Islamic community that upsets a Muslim Filipino when he hears about 
earthquakes in Morocco, Turkey, and Iran, or floods in East Pakistan. It is 
this sentiment that profoundly depresses him when he is informed that 
Muslims are persecuted in some countries. This very sense of community, 
too, makes his heart swell with pride when a fellow Muslim becomes, let 
us say, a member of the International Court of Justice at the Hague or a 
great boxer. It is this community feeling that leads Yugoslavian or 
Tunisian Muslims to crowd around a visiting Muslim Filipino to shower 
him with detailed and even intimate questions. Since this is the case, it 
would be folly to underestimate the community feeling or sense of Islamic 
solidarity that a Maranao in the Philippines has towards a Filipino Samal 
or Yakan.18 
Although it may not make much sense in terms of chronology, the Moros believe 
that Islam was brought to them by seven Arab brothers, the first of the Muslim sultans in 
their islands. This myth points out the fact that the Moros place significance on the 
Islamization that has been taking place and have elevated it to a mythological level. What 
                                                 
17 Majul, 1–12. 
18 Ibid. 
 10
are equally significant were the ruling political elites drawing their legitimacy from the 
much wider Islamic community to which the Moros feel intimately connected to.19   
However, there was a problem with this point of view. The Spanish Jesuits 
believed that Christianity signified not only their religion, but also civilization. In the 
Jesuits’ view, therefore, the Moros were not among the civilized and lived in darkness. 
According to Reverend Pi, Superior of the Jesuit Order, the Moros had been hindrances 
to the colonization of the southern Philippines for over three hundred years due to their 
perceived superiority over other Filipinos and their religious fanaticism. Americans 
would later inherit the Philippines as a colony along with the Spanish view of the Moro. 
The Americans went one step further, however, and saw the Philippines as a nation yet to 
be integrated. In order to establish the Philippines as a unified nation, therefore, the non-
Christian minorities, or the Moros, had to be integrated into the Christian majority.20   
The Moros, as they had done with the Spanish, fiercely refused to be subdued and 
converted. When the Americans received support from the Christianized Filipinos to 
subdue the resistance, the Moros elevated the hostilities even more fiercely than before. 
This was due to their strong belief that their struggle was to protect Muslim sovereignty 
from the Christians.21 The Moros viewed the Christianized Filipinos as the ones that gave 
up the resistance and became collaborators to the oppressors. This hostility still exists 
today, and the Moros continue to see themselves as an independent people. Therefore, 
they still do not recognize the GRP as their sovereign.22 
4. Modern Philippines 
According to Paul Hutchcroft, Americans can be credited for providing the 
foundation of the modern Philippine state.23 At the beginning of its colonial 
                                                 
19 Majul, 1–12. 
20 Go and Foster, 121–122. 
21 Richard V. Weekes, Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey (CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 
462-466; Saleeby, 184–193. 
22 Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion, 67; Majul, Muslim Filipinos, 4, 10, 15–16. 
23 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority 
and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913,” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 2 (May 
2000): 278. 
 11
administration, Americans conducted an investigation looking into the current state of the 
Philippine polity. The investigation was known as the Schurman Commission of 1899. 
The commission determined that the Spanish had set up a central government that 
intervened quite liberally in local governments’ affairs. In actuality, however, the Spanish 
colonial government had extremely limited resources to manage the colonial state’s 
affairs. Therefore, they had to resort to empowering local friars and provincial 
governors.24 
The quest for the Americans to resolve the ongoing armed struggle for 
independence by Filipino guerrillas resulted in making deals and empowering the 
provincial elites. The Americans, however, unwittingly guided the structure and system 
of the modern Philippine government into a weak central authority and strong local 
autonomy. They did so by favoring the provincial elites and making compromises which 
in turn empowered them, both politically and economically.25 The then-American 
colonial policy dictated promoting and maintaining a close association with provincial 
Filipino elites. This close association effectively prevented the Philippine central 
government from establishing and maintaining a strong central authority over provincial 
elites in terms of administrative supervision. Hutchcroft further argued that “both 
administrative and political structures were in most important respects very decentralized, 
and provincial power-holders came to enjoy a great deal of influence over all levels of 
governance—from local bodies up to the executive agencies in Manila. The through 
penetration of the bureaucracy by extensive systems of patronage, moreover, further 
promoted local autonomy at the expense of central authority.”26      
Therefore, American involvement, especially by the first civil governor, William 
Howard Taft, in the formation of the Philippine state and by favoring the provincial elites 
over the central authority can also be credited with the creation of the weak central 
authority.27 
                                                 
24 Hutchcroft, 283. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 278. 
27 Ibid., 277, 279, 282–283.  
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B.  CONFLICT IN MINDANAO 
The origin of the Mindanao conflict can be traced back to the Spanish colonial 
era, during which the Moro were treated unfairly and deprived of ownership of their 
ancestral lands. Following the Spanish-American War, during which the Philippines 
became a U.S. possession, Americans inherited the Spanish “framework of knowledge” 
and continued this bitter legacy with no major improvements in the treatment of the 
Moro.28 
Colonialism, however, was not limited to great powers such as Spain and the 
United States. While it is true that Muslims did form the majority in the southern 
Philippines at the time of the Philippines’ independence in 1946, the GRP began 
implementing a program that actively supported the large-scale migration of farmers 
from the northern islands to the southern islands. The majority of these farmers were 
Christians. Although the size of the Muslim population had grown, the exploding number 
of Christian migrants overshadowed the Muslim population. The Muslims quickly found 
themselves becoming a minority in their homeland.29 
Just as the Americans did, the Christian Filipino majority inherited the Spanish 
“framework of knowledge” and treatment of the Moro. There were severe disparities 
between government services available and opportunities provided to the Christian 
Filipinos and to the Muslims. In some cases, the GRP provided fewer services to the 
Moros than either the Spanish or the American colonial governments. Slowly but surely, 
the Moros were marginalized and isolated from the rest of the Philippines.30  
Scholars have linked this sort of marginalization to specific types of outcomes, 
especially the emergence of a strong ethnic solidarity among the marginalized group, as 
well as a resistance by that group to national governments dominated by the majority 
ethnic group. For instance, according to Hechter, such phenomena may be explained by 
                                                 
28 Go and Foster, 121.  
29 Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of 
the Philippines,” Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (May, 1998): 448. 
30 Thomas McKenna, interview by Nermeen Shaikh, August 18, 2000, Asia Society, Policy and 
Politics, http://www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/philippine.cfm. 
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the theory of “internal colonialism.” Internal colonialism may develop within colonies 
when an ethnic majority becomes a primary decision-making body, dictating the shape 
and direction of the relationship with other ethnic minorities. Such relationships often 
take the form of exploitation of minorities by the majority. As a result of this 
exploitation, minorities tend to form a close network in what is known as “ethnic 
solidarity” or “ethnic mobilization.”31 
Brown argues that “it was the mono-ethnic character of the state which caused 
state penetration to take on an assimilationist form… [which led to] minority 
consciousness and…ethnic nationalism.”32 According to McKenna, “the Muslim 
nationalist movement [in the southern Philippines] is anti-colonial in the same sense as 
any other nationalist movement in Southeast Asia.” He further argues that “[t]he 
difference is that Muslim separatists see Spanish and American colonialism in the 
Muslim Philippines as having been supplanted by colonial rule from Manila under the 
Philippine republic.”33 
The GRP-sponsored “internal colonial” settlement of the Christian Filipinos in the 
southern Philippines caused the marginalization of the Moros and led them to become a 
minority in their own land. The marginalization in their own land might in turn have led 
to the creation of the Moro separatist movements.  
C.  ACTORS 
The belligerent parties involved in the conflict have been constantly changing 
over the history of the conflict: colonial Spaniards, Americans, Christianized Filipinos 
and the Muslim Filipinos. Currently, the conflict is being waged between the GRP and 
the Moros.    
                                                 
31 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975). 
32 David Brown, “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,” 
Pacific Affairs 61, no. 1 (Spring, 1988): 51–77. 
33AsiaSource. 
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1. The Islamic Insurgency 
Although the armed struggle in the southern Philippines is commonly referred to 
as an Islamic insurgency, the religion of Islam does not appear to be a main motivator. 
On the other hand, insurgent groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have been able to rally support by 
appealing to the Islamic cause, which presents a stronger case than does the Moro 
identity by itself.34 There are three major Islamic insurgency groups that are seeking 
either to create an independent Islamic state or to establish autonomy in the southern 
Philippines. They are MNLF, MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  
Their struggles are strictly intrastate in character.35 According to the report 
entitled Terrorism in Southeast Asia, scholars argue that “[s]tructured and unstructured 
factions of the JI are also working with the MILF and the ASG in the Philippines. This 
relationship is largely tactical rather than long-term and ideological.”36 It further argues 
that:  
The insurgency in the Philippines is a domestic phenomenon with deep 
historical roots and an unsuccessful integration of the Muslim population 
into the Christian-dominated state. The conflict in Mindanao is largely due 
to the imposition of the mainstream culture/religion on the minorities and 
due to uneven government policies. There is also a sense of perceived 
repression from the Central Government. The Bangsamoros feel that their 
rights as a minority in the country are not fully recognized and they have 
been deprived from political participation and economic advancement.37 
 
                                                 
34 Jacques Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement 
is Fragile," Pacific Affairs 73, no. 1 (April 1, 2000): 51. 
35 David Martin Jones, Michael L R Smith, and Mark Weeding. "Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in 
Southeast Asia-The Genealogy of a Terror Network," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 6 
(November 2003): 443–457. 
36 Nanyang Technological University and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia: The Threat and Response, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, 2006), 7. 
37 Ibid., 6. 
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a. The Moro National Liberation Front 
The MNLF was established in 1969 in response to the Marcos 
administration’s tough stance against the Muslims. Founded by activists Abul Khayr 
Alonto and Jallaludin Santos and chaired by Nur Misuari, then-professor at the 
University of Philippines, the MNLF represented a vibrant and modern movement in 
separatism in the southern Philippines at the time. Although it appealed strongly to the 
Muslims in the southern Philippines and their cause for ethnic nationalism by referring to 
themselves as the Bangsamoro, or the Moro Nation, the MNLF was distinctively a 
secular and political movement.38 According to Wolters, the purpose of the MNLF was to 
“participate in the elections and with the ultimate aim of creating a federal state in which 
the Muslims would have the opportunity to create their own institutions.”39  
 
Figure 3.   Nur Misuari, Rezlan Jenle, and Nabil Tan.40 
The Bangsa Moro Army, the military wing of the MNLF, received both 
financial and military support from Libya and Malaysia. At its peak in the early 1970s, 
                                                 
38 Federation of American Scientists, “Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),” FAS, http://fas.org/ 
irp/world/para/mnlf.htm.  
39 Willem Wolters, “Muslim Rebel Movements in the Southern Philippines: Recruitment Area for Al-
Qaeda Terrorists?” European Journal of Anthropology, no. 40 (2002): 149–162. 
40From Reuters Pictures, “Nur Misuari (R), leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 
holds hands with Rezlan Jenle (C), director general for multilateral affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Indonesia and Nabil Tan, Philippines government deputy peace adviser after a meeting 
in Manila March 13, 2009,” Reuters Pictures, http://www.daylife.com/photo/0dIN4Ki56H9O1 
?q=Nur+Misuari.   
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the MNLF fielded up to 30,000 fighters. Alarmed by the surge in the MNLF’s strength, 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) committed up to 80 percent of its total combat 
forces to counter the threat. By 1983, however, the strength of the MNLF declined to 
about 50 percent of its peak strength due to GRP’s amnesty program for former 
combatants, the Moro population’s weariness of protracted war, and a factional split in 
the Moro separatist movement.41 
Wolters argues that the factional split of the MNLF in the late 1970s can 
be attributed to built-in structural flaws or contradictions between diverse groups within 
the MNLF. The historical, cultural, and language differences between the Tausug and the 
Maguindanao members were simply too deep to make the relationship last. Further 
weakening the MNLF organization was the uncomfortable alliance between the 
conservative and traditional Muslim leaders and the group of young, university-educated 
radicals.42 According to McKenna, the notion of unification under the banner of 
Bangsamoro had little or no meaning to the members of the MNLF who would rather 
identify themselves with the ethno-linguistic groups such as the Tausug and the 
Maguindanao.43 Furthermore, George argues that the religion of Islam was not a strong 
motivator for keeping the various factions within the MNLF united as it was a secular 
movement and not a religious one.44 
The fragile union of different factions was tested in 1980 when tens of 
thousands of MNLF fighters accepted the GRP’s offer of amnesty, and several thousand 
of them were integrated into the AFP in 1981.45 Since then, the MNLF has been steadily 
making the transition from an armed resistance to a much more distinctive political 
organization, achieving a peace settlement with the GRP in 1996. 
                                                 
41 Federation of American Scientists. 
42 Wolters. 156–157. 
43 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the 
Southern Philippines (Pasig City, Manila: Anvil Publishing, 1998), 4. 
44 T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).  
45 Wolters, 157. 
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In the midst of allegations of corruption in 2001, Nur Misuari lost the 
election for the governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), thus 
losing his position as the incumbent. Furthermore, the GRP accused him of having 
masterminded the attacks on government offices in Jolo, causing numerous casualties. 
Fearing capture by the AFP, he fled to Malaysia. However, the local authorities arrested 
and extradited him to the Philippines where he was put in jail.46  
The future is rather uncertain for the members of the MNLF as they 
struggle with a sense of betrayal by both the MNLF leadership and the GRP. 
b. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front was established in 1984 by a faction 
that had broken away from the MNLF. The leader of the faction was Salamat Hashim 
who received radical Islamic teachings and military training in various places such as 
Egypt and Libya. There were several reasons why the faction decided to leave the ranks 
of the MNLF. An internal fault line along the use of funds and ethnic differences 
contributed to the split. However, the primary reason for the division was the 
disagreement over the peace negotiations with the GRP. While the group led by Nur 
Misuari wanted to engage in a peace process, Salamat Hashim and his faction wanted to 
continue with the armed struggle.47 
The ultimate goal of the MILF is for the Moros to gain an independence 
from the Philippines and to establish an Islamic state governed by Shariah law.48 
Predominantly made of Magindanao members, the MILF created several camps 
throughout the province of Magindanao, with the main base located in Camp Abubakar 
As-Siddique.  
According to Tiglao, the MILF had proven itself a formidable opponent of 
the AFP with the number of armed fighters reaching an estimated 15,000 by the end of 
the 1990s. It had also actively engaged in training its personnel and even sent fighters to 
                                                 
46 Wolters, 157. 
47 Ibid., 158. 
48 Ibid., 159. 
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Afghanistan in the 80s to gain experience in combat.49 Their continued armed struggle, 
however, had claimed a high price, causing heavy damages to the local infrastructure and 
economy.50  
The extended military campaign has led both the MILF and the GRP to 
spend a great deal of resources they can seldom afford. Since the early 2000s, both sides 
have been in a stalemate with no significant episodes of violence. The stalemate, 
however, may be coming to an end as the peace negotiations dissolved in 2008 without 
an agreement. There are signs that the military campaign is intensifying. The fight 
continues away from the battlefields as well. In response to the AFP’s intensifying 
military campaign, the MILF has stepped up a media campaign against the AFP. 
According to the MILF secretariat, the AFP has been conducting indiscriminate attacks 
on civilians in an effort to root out the suspected MILF sympathizers. The number of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) has reached an estimated 600,000 in Mindanao.51 
 
Figure 4.   Murad Ebrahim inspecting MILF troops.52 
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/51474234/AFP.     
 19
Several factions within the MILF appear to have been severing ties with 
the organization lately. There are some who argue that “[e]ven with factionalism within 
the group, the MILF leadership remains strong and in control…gradual decline of 
resources and war fatigue…peace would appear to be more attractive for the group and 
its supporters.”53 On the other hand, each group with its own commanders and agendas 
may present more difficult challenges for the prospect of peace.54 
c. The Abu Sayyaf Group 
Founded by Abubakar Janjalani in 1991, the ASG55 is the smallest and the 
most radical of the three Islamic separatist organizations in the southern Philippines. 
Based in the Basilan Islands, they enjoy local popular support in their struggle against the 
better equipped and trained AFP. Janjalani was an Islamic scholar who wanted to create 
an Islamic state ruled by Shariah law.56  
The ASG has a known association with Al-Qaeda and JI, and has been 
officially designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.57 
Some scholars believe that the association is more than casual. In fact, they argue that 
there is an established relationship between the ASG, Al-Qaeda, and JI and that it is 
deepening.58 Although the attacks may not be directed against Christians in particular, 
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Upon Abubakar Janjalani’s death in 1998, Khaddafi Janjalani took over 
the leadership of the ASG. Unlike his elder brother Abubakar, Khaddafi was not an 
Islamic scholar. The change in the group’s direction became evident in 2000 when the 
ASG began shifting its activities to banditry and kidnapping for ransom. The ASG 
committed several kidnappings of western tourists, including Americans. In each instance 
a large sum of money was demanded in exchange for the hostages’ safe return. Indeed, 
according to the MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim, "[t]he original Abu Sayyaf group, 
under the older brother Abdurajak, had a political objective…As far as the personality of 
the younger brother Khadafi is concerned, he's not an ideological leader and I don't know 
how much control he has with the organization."60  
 
Figure 5.   Released Hostage Mary Jean Lacaba.61 
The latest kidnapping took place early in 2009 when workers for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were taken hostage. A Filipina hostage 
named Mary Jean Lacaba was released in April. However, the fate of the remaining 
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hostages; Eugenio Vagni and Andreas Notter, Italian and Swiss respectively, is uncertain 
at this time. The AFP temporarily suspended military operations against ASG in response 
to the hostage’s release.62  
In response to the ASG’s changing demands for negotiation, however, the 
Sulu governor, Abdusakur Tan, urged the ASG to “get their acts together” before 
attempting to negotiate with the GRP, indicating that the ASG may no longer be 
operating under a coherent leadership.63        
D.  PEACE PROCESSES 
The ongoing violence has deprived the local residents of peace and stability. The 
Philippine government, rebel groups, and various international mediators attempted to 
bring peace to the southern Philippine region in 1976, 1996 and 2008. However, none of 
these efforts ever achieved more than a partial success..  
During President Ferdinand Marcos’ regime, the MNLF reached its height in 
terms of armed resistance with an estimated 30,000 fighters.64 At the peak of the 
hostilities during the period from 1972 to 1976, the AFP had to commit up to 80 percent 
of its total resources just to keep the conflict at a manageable level.65   
The 1976 peace agreement, also known as the Tripoli Agreement, was unique 
because the MNLF as Islamic separatists had received a wide range of support from other 
Islamic nations such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (OIC), a body of foreign ministers from the 
influential Muslim states. The OIC, in particular, put pressure on the GRP to negotiate 
with the MNLF by threatening to cut oil supplies.66 
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The immediate goal of the 1976 peace agreement was to end all hostilities right 
away. More importantly, it provided the framework for the Moros to create an 
autonomous region among the thirteen provinces in Mindanao. The peace agreement did 
in fact effectively end the hostilities. However, the Marcos regime failed to implement 
the autonomous region. In 1986, President Corazon Aquino added a condition to the 
agreement that the thirteen provinces be given choices to determine for themselves on 
whether to join the autonomous region or to maintain their status quo by popular vote. 
Only the four provinces with a Muslim majority voted for the autonomous region. The 
MNLF fighters became furious at the GRP’s blatant violation of the peace agreement. 
The hostilities would resume in less than a year .67  
The next peace agreement took place in 1996 between President Fidel Ramos’ 
administration and the MNLF. The agreement called for the establishment of the 
Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to oversee 
development projects in all thirteen provinces in Mindanao. It also called for a popular 
vote in three years for the provinces to determine for themselves whether to become part 
of the Regional Autonomous Government. After three years, only one more province 
would decide to join the autonomous region due to the SPCPD’s poor performance 
administering the development.68 Thomas McKenna argues that the poor performance 
was caused by opposition legislators who introduced various measures to deprive the 
funding that was crucial for implementing the peace agreement. He further argues that the 
GRP should have included other key stakeholders such as the MILF in the peace 
negotiations.69 
In April 2000, President Joseph Estrada decided to declare a policy of “all-out 
war” on the MILF. Although the policy was successful militarily in capturing MILF 
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strongholds, it ultimately failed to subdue the MILF rebels. As a result of relying heavily 
on a direct military campaign, it became even more difficult to confront the rebels that 
now are dispersed throughout the most remote areas of Mindanao.70 
In 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a policy of “all-out peace” 
and began holding peace talks with the new MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim. The most 
recent hope for a peaceful resolution to the conflict between the MILF and the GRP was 
shattered on October 14, 2008, when the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared that 
the draft peace agreement was unconstitutional.71 The latest peace talks, which had been 
ongoing for eleven years, since 1997, had produced a draft agreement known as the 
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that includes specific 
provisions for defining the relationship between the Bangsamoro Juridical Entry (BJE) 
and the GRP, and the fate of the disputed ancestral land.72 In what can only be described 
as anticlimactic, the final version of the MOA-AD was about to be signed by both the 
GRP and the MILF representatives in August 2008 when it was interrupted by court 
injunction issued by the Philippine Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declared it 
unconstitutional in the following October.73 
On the surface, it may appear as though both parties were very close in agreeing 
on the MOA-AD. Therefore, once the peace talks resume, negotiations may start at the 
point where they left off. In reality, it may now be more difficult than ever for all parties 
to agree on the MOA-AD. This is because there are deep disagreements over core issues: 
The oppositions argue that the proposed establishment of BJE appears to be a move 
toward independence from the sovereign nation of the Philippines. They also argue that 
not all key stakeholders were consulted prior to the attempted signing of the document.74  
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The prospect for future peace in the Philippines has become rather uncertain with 
the collapse of the peace talks. While both sides claim that they are ready to resume the 
peace talks, it is unlikely that this will happen in the near future due to the following 
impasse: The GRP now argues that the MILF has to undergo a disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process prior to the talks. The MILF mistrusts 
the GRP because they have seen the GRP fail to deliver what they had promised time and 
time again.75 The impasse may not be resolved until the current president Arroyo steps 
down in 2010. Even then, the renewed talks would most likely require an international 
third-party to facilitate the broad spectrum of the current impasse, the local and national 
politics, military, and historical marginalization of the Moros, and to monitor the actual 
implementation of the terms.        
Splintering of the MILF will make it even more difficult for the GRP to conduct 
peace negotiations. The central leadership of the MILF will exert less control over the 
splintered factions who have agendas of their own that may be different from the overall 
goal of the MILF.76 Nevertheless, the MILF spokesperson asserts that they are willing to 
engage in further talks because they believe the negotiation will help their struggles. The 
negotiators for the GRP are also interested in resuming “negotiations to resolve once and 
for all the long-running insurgency conflict in the South."77 
E.  SUMMARY 
There are other obstacles to peace in the southern Philippines. The GRP is 
characterized as a weak central government whose legitimacy is questioned by the 
Islamic separatists and even, at times, by its own military. Political instability resulting 
from President Arroyo’s limited influence in military affairs makes it difficult to attain 
the full cooperation of the military when dealing with the insurgency.78 The three 
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branches of the GRP lack consensus, which means that the peace agreement that the 
executive branch worked so hard to develop might be declared unconstitutional by the 
judicial branch. Changes in the GRP administration and each branch’s respective position 
on the agreement present major challenges to reaching a peace settlement. On the other 
side of the conflict, rivalries and disputes between the insurgency groups, including the 
MNLF, the MILF, the Datus, and the Moros contribute to the difficulties.79  
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III. THE SECOND FRONT 
A.  BACKGROUND 
After the closure of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines in 1992, U.S. 
relations with the Philippines had been in a state of neglect, but the situation began to 
improve in January 2002. The Philippines began receiving about $100 million per year in 
security and economic aid packages on the condition that the GRP increase its counter-
terrorism efforts.80 U.S. troops were deployed to Western Mindanao to participate in a 
training exercise called Balikatan.81 The deployment included several hundred U.S. 
Special Forces who would be acting in an advisory capacity with the right to return fire in 
self-defense. However, the exercise reportedly evolved into a series of combat operations 
designed to cripple the ASG’s ability to conduct armed attacks.82  
The opening of the so-called “second front” in the GWOT resulted in the Bush 
and Arroyo administrations drawing heavy criticism from opponents of the GRP.83 Many 
considered the presence of the U.S. troops a clear violation of the Philippines’ 1987 
Constitution, which does not allow foreign troops to operate within its territory except 
under the terms of a treaty. The two existing treaties with the United States are clear in 
allowing foreign troops only in defense against an external, not an internal, threat.84  
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Critics point to the second front policy as one of the contributing factors to the 
United States’ gradual loss of influence in Southeast Asia, citing its rather narrow focus 
on combating terrorism and disregard for the importance of multilateral relationships as 
points of contention.85 Critics were also concerned that the second front policy might 
alienate and motivate the Islamic insurgency groups, raise anti-American sentiment, and 
culminate in the rise of a pan-Islamic alliance that did not yet exist.86 Richard Betts 
warns that “U.S. leaders can say that they are not waging a war against Islam until they 
are blue in the face, but this will not convince Muslims who already distrust the United 
States.”87 Also, the possibility that non-democratic forms of government without a 
popular base will gain a foothold in the region could not be completely ruled out as the 
United States supports regional governments with military and financial aid, which may 
in turn be used to increase a regional government’s legitimacy and power.88  
The remainder of this chapter examines the implications of the second front 
policy from four different angles: military, political, diplomatic, and legal.  
B.  MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 
The second front policy is a highly militaristic approach to resolving the Islamic 
terrorist activities in the southern Philippines that have been identified as having the 
potential to support anti-American transnational terrorist organizations. This policy has 
been successful in reducing the terrorist activities considerably. However, despite 
implementing the policy for over seven years, terrorist activities continue.     
Immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, President Macapagal-Arroyo 
allowed the United States military to gain access to AFP bases. The move enabled the 
U.S. military to establish a presence and to assist the AFP in their efforts to counter 
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terrorism in the southern Philippines. In 2006, the joint efforts culminated in thirty-seven 
exercises, including Balikatan, involving 6,000 U.S. military personnel.89 According to 
the U.S. Department of State, the exercises “contribute directly to the Philippine armed 
forces' efforts to root out Abu Sayyaf. …"90 
Military assistance and arms sales by the United States to the Republic of the 
Philippines have also increased dramatically since 2001. When comparing the U.S. 
assistance and arms sales between years 1997 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006, the latter period 
saw more than a 60 percent increase.91  
 
Figure 6.   U.S. Military Assistance and Sales to Philippines.92 
The United States also offers monetary rewards to those who provide actionable 
intelligence leading directly to the killing or capture of perpetrators alleged to have 
committed terrorist activities. The payoff was upwards of $10 million in the year 2007 
alone. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence personnel also provide counterterrorism 
training to the Filipino counterparts.93 
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On the other hand, critics of the direct military approach such as See Seng Tan 
and Kumar Ramakrishna argue that: “Southeast Asia’s current problems are unlikely to 
be resolved by a counterterrorism strategy that emphasizes military solutions.”94 
According to General Juancho Sabban who led the Task Force Comet, the elite 
counterterrorist unit in Sulu, there is a limit to the direct military approach in combating 
terrorism.  
[U]using a strategy of force.…turned out to be a vicious cycle….the more 
we destroyed, the more the number of the enemy increased….people 
resent the military….I have told my commanders that all military 
operations should be intelligence-driven and surgical. How do we do this? 
Through intelligence enhanced by civil-military operations. We do civil-
military operations to get people onto our side. More people on your side 
will produce more and better intelligence, and if you have better 
intelligence you'll have more successful operations that are precise and 
surgical and that don't hurt innocent civilians. Thus we will get more 
support from the people and you will be denying the enemy resources and 
space to operate. People will drive them from their own areas. So now 
their space is getting smaller and smaller, until we can pinpoint them with 
information coming from the people themselves.95 
There have been efforts to shift the strategy from the direct to the indirect 
approach. Civil affairs units have been actively conducting operations to keep the 
insurgents from gaining a safe haven among the populace. The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) is equally active by completing several key projects 
such as retraining facilities for former MNLF fighters and planning for future projects 
that are valued at over $130 million.96 
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In terms of combating terrorism, the second front policy has achieved success in 
reducing the ASG’s terrorist activities. The greatest indicator of success for the military 
approach may be that the ASG has not launched a major terrorist attack since 2005. 
Furthermore, their practice of exchanging hostages for ransom signifies the financial 
difficulties they currently face.  
C.  POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Immediately following the September 11 attacks, President Arroyo pledged to 
President Bush to provide “help in whatever way” possible to combat terrorism. Since 
then, the two countries have been actively cooperating in terms of sharing intelligence 
and investigating suspected terrorists.97 While the security cooperation, with respect to 
the second front policy is being conducted at the state level, its successful implementation 
is heavily dependent upon cooperation among the local actors. This fact becomes even 
more apparent in states with weak central government such as the Philippines. The 
complex relationship between local and national civilian and military leaderships may 
well decide the fate of the state level policy. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the 
relationship so that a more “nuanced approach” can be taken to increase the chance for a 
successful implementation of the policy.98 This section analyzes the politics surrounding 
the second front from the perspectives of the United States and the GRP, as well as the 
local Filipinos and the Moros.   
The end of the Cold War signaled a greatly increased demand for the military, 
rather than a decrease. The increase came with a caviat: the military is to engage the 
transnational threats in a non-traditional warfare. According to Derek Reveron, “[w]hile 
Geroge W. Bush abhorred this “misuse” of the military in the 2000 presidential election, 
as president he did not alter course. In fact, use of the military in “nontraditional” ways 
actually escalated at the same time traditional uses of the military occurred in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”99 He further argued that the Bush administration actually increased the use 
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of the military to build foreign militaries around the world as part of the GWOT. The 
AFP became one of the first beneficiaries of one of these Bush administration 
programs.100 
The 9/11 attacks heightened the sense of American interdependence with other 
states around the world. American leaders began to see the weak states as potential 
threats to their national security, making changes along the way from realist perspectives 
to more idealistic neoconservative perspectives.101 According to Condoleezza Rice, “in a 
world as increasingly interconnected as ours, the international state system is only as 
strong as its weakest links. We cannot afford another situation like the one that emerged 
in 2001 in Afghanistan.”102 
While it is unclear which direction the policy is heading now under the current 
U.S. administration, President Arroyo’s immediate and willing support for the second 
front seemed to have played a key role in “galvaniz[ing] resentment from nationalist 
parties, which suspected a return of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines.”103 Philippine 
Senator Miriam Santiago has referred to the Obama administration’s preference of the 
term “Overseas Contingency Operations” over the “Global War on Terror” as a clear 
indication that the purpose of the Phlippine-U.S. Visiting Forces agreement (VFA) has 
been met, therefore no longer needed. Without the VFA that was enacted during 
President Estrada’s administration, the presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines may not 
be justified, as the Philippine Constitution specifically prohibits foreign military forces 
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from conducting operations within its territory. This may be a calculated move to 
undermine and isolate President Arroyo from her one source of power, which has been 
the strong military and financial backing from the United States.104  
Senator Aquilino Pimentel’s proposal advocating the VFA, on the other hand, 
represents the opposing spectrum of Filipino politics that welcome the American 
presence. He argues that without U.S. military and financial support which the current 
VFA affords, it will be extremely difficult for the AFP to successfully combat terrorism 
alone. Naturally, President Arroyo and the Philippine Palace agree and support Senator 
Pimentel’s proposal.105 According to Zachary Abuza, it is President Arroyo’s wish to 
restore the security alliance the Philippines once enjoyed with the United States, that 
ended with the American base closures. The restoration of the security alliance will serve 
to strengthen the AFP in combating the insurgents in the southern Philippines. 
Furthermore, the Arroyo administration may be attempting to forge a close tie with the 
AFP by advocating U.S. military aid. Although Arroyo may consider impeachment 
attempts a thing of the past, with her coalition winning the majority seats in the Lower 
House in the latest election, other means of removing her from power are still present. 
Considering the historical role the coups d’état has played in Filipino politics, the latest 
uncovered plot to coup, and the lowest approval rate of any president since 1986, she has 
every reason to enlist the military to maximize her political survival.106        
Local politics in the southern Philippines are driven by suspicion and distrust 
between the Filipinos and the Moros. The media fuels this distrust by portraying the 
Moros as “Muslim criminals” and blaming the “Islamic terrorists” for the ongoing 
violence; it rarely criticizes the actions of the GRP or the AFP. In addition, it rarely 
reports the historical causes of the conflict or the perspectives of the Moros.107 The latest 
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peace negotiations have failed as the presidential representative to the peace process 
proceeded to finalize the MOU-AD without consulting all potentially affected parties. 
The governor of North Cotabato, one of such parties who became suspicious of the 
central government’s secretive peace process, filed a petition to delay the peace process, 
which ultimately led to the demise of the MOU-AD.108    
Willem Wolters argues that the cessation of armed clashes following the previous 
peace settlements between the separatists and the GRP did not translate into economic 
growth in Mindanao. On the contrary, the opposite was true with many of the Mindanao 
provinces joining the ranks of the poorest regions in the Philippines.109 
2000 1997 1994 Percent Change 
Province 




Sulu 0.351 77 0.336 77 0.357 76 4.3 (5.9) 
Tawi-Tawi 0.390 76 0.430 74 0.387 75 (9.3) 11.1 
Basilan 0.425 75 0.439 73 0.423 73 (3.3) 3.8 
Ifugao 0.461 74 0.452 72 0.406 74 1.9 11.3 
Maguindanao 0.461 73 0.416 75 0.449 71 10.8 (7.3) 
Lanao del Sur 0.464 72 0.415 76 0.442 72 11.8 (6.1) 
Agusan del Sur 0.482 71 0.482 70 0.459 70 - 5.0 
Samar 0.511 70 0.493 67 0.462 67 3.6 6.7 
Lanao del Norte 0.512 69 0.470 71 0.473 65 8.8 (0.6) 
Sarangani 0.516 68 0.494 66 0.529 46 4.5 (6.6) 
Table 1.   The Bottom Ten Provinces in HDI, 2000.110 
The 2000 Philippine Human Development Index (HDI) indicated that the bottom 
ten provinces were from the southern Philippines with eight of them located in Mindanao 
(Table 1). Unfortunately, being ranked at the bottom also means that these provinces lack 
even the most basic of all facilities such as the schools, health clinics, water, and 
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electricity that are required for growth.111 While the country’s overall HDI showed 
improvement in 2000 when compared to 1994, the bottom ten provinces’ HDI showed 
little or no improvements. The significantly disparate economic and living conditions 
with no improvement in sight may negate any impact made by the U.S. or the Philippine 
military and may help reinforce and fuel the Moros’ resentment towards the Manila based 
regime.112 
Contrary to the Moros’ popular perception, the Filipinos may not be the only 
party responsible for their economic dismay following the peace negotiations. 
Apparently, the GRP had allocated about $600 million to be used to improve the living 
standards in these bottom provinces. However, Misuari, as the first governor of the 
ARMM, took control of the funds and invested instead in large projects that had little to 
no impact on improving the actual quality of life in the region. In addition, he was 
accused of using public money to fund extravagant lifestyle.113 When his attempts at 
remaining in the governor’s seat failed, and reaching the end of his term, he staged an 
attack against the AFP in hopes of gaining support and resurrecting the armed rebellion. 
When the attempts failed, he fled to Malaysia where he was arrested by the authorities 
and deported to the Philippines. 
It is interesting to note that the Moros also welcomed the American presence in 
the southern Philippines, albeit for different reasons. The local Muslims approved and 
supported the Balikatan exercises designed to root out the ASG that had strayed away 
from the true Islam based on tolerance and compassion. Terrorist activities committed by 
extremists in the name of Islam had become a real concern for the moderates.114 
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The Muslim’s ever-present distrust of the Filipinos played a part here as well. 
They were suspicious of the Filipinos’ intentions. Some even argued that the Filipinos 
would use the Balikatan as a platform to launch an even stronger military action against 
the Moros. In that respect, the Americans were seen as the limiting agent of the AFP’s 
overt reliance on military intervention. Consequently, support was strictly reserved for 
American military personnel only.115  
D.  REGIONAL DIPLOMACY PERSPECTIVE 
The Southeast Asia region has the world’s largest Muslim population. Any 
counter-terrorism policy introduced by the United States may potentially be seen by the 
world as measures taken against Muslims. As such, it is extremely important for the 
United States to be aware of and maintain a high-level of sensitivity on how the 
Southeast Asian countries respond to the U.S. counter-terrorism policy in order to gain an 
upper hand in the GWOT.116  
Preceding the second front policy were a series of events that caused U.S. security 
experts to raise an alarm: the demise of the Suharto regime and the increasing role of 
Islam in the politics in Indonesia. While some may argue its level of democracy, the 
Suharto regime had been maintaining a relatively stable governance over the largest 
Muslim population in the world. With the stable overwatch gone, the door seemed open 
for terrorists who seek refuge from U.S. persecution in Afghanistan.117 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, President Bush announced to nations 
throughout the world that they now have “a decision to make: either you are with us or 
you are with the terrorists.”118 In the following year, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
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toured the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that had been designated as 
the “second front” in the “global war on terror” to ensure their full cooperation.119 In 
August 2002, this effort eventually led to the U.S.-ASEAN Joint Declaration for 
Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in which the signatories promised to 
enhance the process of intelligence-sharing and the freezing of suspected terrorists’ 
assets.120 
 
Figure 7.   Gloria Arroyo meets with Colin Powell in 2002.121 
S. Jayakumar, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, argued that in 
order to maintain a good relations with the United States, Southeast Asian countries had 
no choice but to “cooperate in the anti-terrorism campaign.”122 On the surface, the 
perception and behavior of Southeast Asian countries appears to have been shaped by the 
U.S. counter-terrorism policy. While it is true that the policy helps these countries 
sharpen their focus on long-term security, pre-existing domestic concerns such as 
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“divergent interests, sensitivities, and fears about adverse domestic reactions”123 interact 
with security matters in far more intricate ways than the U.S. administrations tend to 
understand. This affects how countries choose their methods of dealing with terrorist 
threats within their sovereign boundaries.124 
Andrew Chau argues that in order to gain meaningful security cooperation with 
ASEAN countries, they must be approached through “diplomatic processes.” This is in 
line with the “ASEAN norms of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of neighboring states.” In his research conducted in 2008, he investigated 
the level of cooperation among ASEAN countries facing significant terrorism threats. 
The research revealed that despite the fact that some of the threats have successfully 
materialized, the countries managed to reach bilateral cooperation but fell short of the 
multilateral cooperation as they originally hoped to achieve. Chau attributes this 
disappointing fact to the unique ASEAN diplomatic characteristic of non-interference 
with another state sovereignty.125  
By contrast, the second front policy was founded on strong pro-war rhetoric that 
was codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), which states “We choose to 
deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations. We fight our 
enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country. We seek to shape the 
world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at 
their mercy.”126 Together with the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption and the 
U.S. military’s entrenchment in the southern Philippines, the unilateralist approach of the 
second front is in direct confrontation with ASEAN norms.127  
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In such a setting, how can the United States obtain meaningful security 
cooperation from the ASEAN to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia? Amitav Acharya 
argues that the ASEAN traditionally settles disputes by reaching consensus while 
respecting state sovereignty.128 The United States must find a way to assert itself while 
respecting the way of the ASEAN and turn the current practice of security cooperation on 
an ad hoc basis into a permanent multilateral practice and shy away from the 
“opportunity to refashion the world.”129 
E.  LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
The concept of preemptively employing force in self-defense, or simply 
preemption, is not new as evidenced throughout history. States have acted in self-defense 
to immediate threats not yet fully materialized. In the United States, the Bush 
administration’s second front policy is an example of such a preemptive use of force in 
self-defense. The concept of preemption is ingrained into the administration’s policies 
and directives. The legality of preemption, however, has been a highly debated subject 
among scholars who study law. This section examines the second front policy in the 
southern Philippines in the context of international law. It is extremely important for the 
United States, as a nation ruled by law, to have its policies supported by strong legal 
arguments, which in turn will provide a legitimate basis for its actions against terrorism 
in Southeast Asia, where non-inteference and respect for sovereignty are highly regarded 
commodities.   
1. The Bush Doctrine of Preemption 
In September 2002, the Bush administration issued the National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America, which states that the United States faces unique 
challenges to its national security.130 Updated in March 2006, the NSS further states the 
American resolve in tackling security challenges: “Our strong preference and common 
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practice is to address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy, in concert 
with key allies and regional partners. If necessary, however, under long-standing 
principles of self defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attacks.”131 The United 
States’ claim to the right to self-defense, even preemptively when the threat is not 
perceived as acute or imminent, is known as the Bush Doctrine.132 
The Bush Doctrine is not the first attempt to incorporate the concept into an 
official policy of a state. Indeed, the right to use force preemptively originated with the 
Reagan administration.133 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, issued in 
April 1984, states that “[w]henever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends 
to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measure [sic] to 
protect our citizens, property, and interests.”134 Furthermore, NSDD 207 issued in 
January 1986 states that the United States may pursue the option of using force 
“unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.”135 
In January 1986, then-Secretary of State, George Shultz, in response to critics 
who questioned the legality of preempting terrorism by the use of force, argued that a 
nation under attack is “permitted to use force to preempt future attacks, to seize 
terrorists…this nation has consistently affirmed that right of states to use force 
in…individual or collective self-defense.”136 He foresaw the controversies that such 
action may bring, even among traditional friends and allies of the United States. 
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However, he further argued that doing nothing in response would only mean victory for 
the enemies as the United States might appear to be “impotent.”137   
2. Principles of Self-defense and International Law 
Chapter I, article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter is considered to be Jus 
Cogens, or a peremptory norm, with regard to the use of force.138 It states that “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”139 
 Traditional Self-Defense Anticipatory Self-Defense Preemptive Self-Defense 
Threat Actual Imminent Highly likely 
Time Past / present At any moment At some future 
Evidence Actual aggression Palpable Extrapolative / speculative 
Principle S.S. Lotus S.S. Caroline Sofaer’s elements 
Table 2.   Classification of Self-defense.140  
Self-defense, in response to armed aggression is perfectly legal according to 
Chapter VII, article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that “[n]othing in the present 
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attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”141 UNSC resolution (SCR) 1368 
also recognizes states’ “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter.”142  
According to factors such as the nature of threats, timelines, and supporting 
evidence available, self-defense may be categorized by three types: traditional, 
anticipatory, and preemptive.143 Table 2 provides a quick side-by-side comparison of the 
different kinds of self-defense discussed. 
a. Traditional Self-defense 
In the Case of the S. S. “Lotus” (1927), the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) asserted that the use of force may be legal only under certain 
conditions. The set conditions were that the use of force must be absolutely necessary in 
self-defense in response to an “actual” aggression and any armed response must be 
proportional to the aggression.144 
b. Anticipatory Self-defense 
The principle of anticipatory self-defense was established as a result of 
what is known as the Caroline Affair. In December 1837, Canadian loyalist and British 
forces captured and burned the S.S. Caroline, which was moored in American territorial 
waters. The ship was known to have carried supplies for the Canadian rebels in the 
past.145 In his letter to Lord Ashburton, who was the British Special Minister at the time, 
then-Secretary of State Daniel Webster complained that British troops violated the 
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sovereign territory of the United States.146 He argued for strict conditions validating an 
anticipatory self-defense as “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation"147 The conditions are known as the Caroline test, which is used 
as a guideline for determining the legality of anticipatory self-defense.  
c. Preemptive Self-defense 
The preemptive form of self-defense is distinguished from other forms of 
self-defense by the fact that threats may be neither actual nor imminent. According to 
Richard Betts, the preemptive form of self-defense is also distinguishable from the 
preventive form: “Preemptive war is more legitimate than preventive war not because of 
a moral difference between the two in principle, but because of a practical difference in 
the weight of evidence that the adversary is bound to attack at some point.”148 The 
aforementioned Bush Doctrine is an example of preemptive self-defense incorporated 
into an official state policy.  
Preemptive self-defense, in principle, would not pass the Caroline test 
because the latter requires the threat to be imminent. Nevertheless, there have been 
attempts to justify the principle of preemption. Abraham Sofaer argues that preemption 
“requires a more nuanced evaluation than that implied by Webster’s pronouncement in 
The Caroline case. Properly applied, pre-emption is an aspect of a state’s legitimate self-
defence [sic] authority.”149 According to Sofaer, there are “standards” that must be met to 
justify preemptive self-defense: “the nature and magnitude of the threat…the likelihood 
that the threat will be realized…the availability and exhaustion of alternatives…whether 
using pre-emptive force is consistent with…the UN Charter.”150 
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Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong argue that the UN Charter only 
authorizes the use of force in self-defense in response to an armed attack that has already 
occurred.151 Preemptive self-defense, therefore, tends to be unilateral and without prior 
UN authorization.152 This may be due in part to the shifting nature of threats from 
conventional to WMD, each becoming more deadly than the previous iteration, and often 
giving less warning than before.153  
Have there been any previous attempts by states to exercise preemptive 
self-defense? According to Dan Reiter, a close examination of history reveals that 
preemptive wars rarely occur: “Russo-German interactions in July 1914 [during WWI], 
the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950, and the Israeli attack on Egypt in 
1967, which began the Six Day War.”154 
3. Arguments for Preemption 
Relations with other countries that were traditional allies were put to test when the 
United States began building the case against Iraq. France, Germany, and Russia all 
opposed the proposed armed aggression against Iraq. Nevertheless, the United States 
went ahead with the invasion, suggesting perhaps that the complex interdependence 
theory’s claim on limiting the use of force had become irrelevant.155 Apparently for the 
United States, maintaining peace and stability in national security ranked higher among 
its priorities than maintaining norms in economic, social, and political partnership with 
them.156 The Bush administration, instead of arguing the case for war as a "just" 
preemptive war, which resembles preventive war too closely and which is prohibited by 
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international law, instead made an argument based on previous resolutions that were still 
active in the absence of new resolutions reversing them.157 
In arguing the case for preemptive self-defense, John Yoo, then-Deputy Assistant to 
the Attorney General, quoted article 51 of the UN Charter, which states “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”158 
What sets the current circumstances apart from the previous ones is the presence 
of WMD and non-state actors such as transnational terrorists? Historian John Lewis 
Gaddis argues that the current policies of “deterrence and containment are no longer 
relevant” in meeting the threats from non-state terrorists.159 In January 1998, the Project 
for the New American Century, a think tank known to be neo-conservative, asserted in a 
letter to President Clinton that the United States’ foreign policy of containment of Iraq 
was not achieving its intended goals. Therefore, the letter argued that Saddam Hussein 
must be removed from power and doing so would be in the interest of the security of the 
United States and its allies.160 
Arthur Lehman Goodhart, a prominent Oxford scholar and practitioner in law, 
argues that the United Nations has not been successful in preventing armed aggressions 
throughout the world as it was originally designed to do.161 Furthermore, he argues that 
the UN Charter is impractical in meeting today’s security challenges.162 Edward Luck, 
the director of the Center on International Organization, agreed when he said that “[t]he 
United Nations, sadly, has drifted far from its founding vision. Its Charter neither calls 
                                                 
157 Frederic L. Kirgis, “The Legal Background on the use of Force to Induce Iraq to Comply with 
Security Council Resolutions,” ASIL Insights, http://www.asil.org/insigh12.cfm. 
158 Yoo, 571; Charter of the United Nations (1945), Article 51. 
159 John Lewis Gaddis cited in Hehir: 11. 
160 Project for the New American Century, “Letter to President Clinton,” 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm. 
161 Gardner: 589.  
162 Ibid.  
 46
for a democratic council nor relegates the collective use of force to a last resort. It was a 
wartime document of a military alliance, not a universal peace platform.”163 
The UN Charter when interpreted as a treaty, can be suspended by members of the 
treaty when the circumstances in which the members went into a treaty undergo 
fundamental change.164 WMD were not present at the time of the adoption of the UN 
Charter. However, the nature of WMD may mean a preemptive strike is the only viable 
option for defense. John Murphy, therefore, believes that the UN Charter has become 
irrelevant.165 Professor Frederic Kirgis agreed when he said “threat of large-scale terrorism 
with weapons of mass destruction was not foreseen when the Charter was drawn up, and 
one could argue that the other conditions of the Vienna Convention allowing suspension of 
a treaty obligation under changed circumstances have been met as well.”166 
Richard Gardner, a law professor and former U.S. Ambassador to Spain and Italy, 
argues that the norms of international law do not adequately address the new security 
challenges presented by transnational terrorists in possession of WMD. Therefore, he 
argued that the UN Charter should undergo a “reinterpretation” to allow the use of force, 
without UNSC approval, to combat transnational terrorists and those states that aid 
them.167 After all, Joshua Muravchik, a renowned legal scholar, argues that “[the United 
States has been] a better agent of U.N. goals than the organization itself.”168  
Prior to committing its forces to war, the Bush administration argued the case for 
a preemptive strike against Iraq and attempted to obtain the Security Council’s 
authorization. The Security Council neither supported nor condemned the U.S. invasion 
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of Iraq at the time. However, the reinterpretation argument was strengthened by the 
questionable endorsement of the Security Council when it approved SCR 1511, 
authorizing the United States and its allies to occupy Iraq for the purpose of providing 
security and reconstruction.169  
Jacques deLisle, a Senior Fellow for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, argued 
that “unlawfulness is not the same thing as lawlessness… rejecting prescribed legal 
processes is not the same thing as rejecting all legal principle.”170 He further argues that 
“[w]here some legal rules are breached, principles can still guide and constrain, justify 
and condemn. Many of those principles are legal or closely entangled with law. To think 
otherwise is to hold a naive and crude notion of law (particularly international law).”171 
International law is known to change as customary practices evolve over time. 
There are several ways that this may become a reality: strong states asserting foreign 
policy on weaker states, weaker states’ reactions, and the relevance of precedents to 
current circumstances.172 With respect to the latter, it can be argued that the present 
circumstances are very different from the past circumstances in which the Caroline test  
was formulated. Considering that circumstances have changed dramatically since then, it 
can further be argued that the Caroline test, either partially or in its entirety, may be 
irrelevant today.173 
In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, judges of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed the legal opinion that indeed states 
maintain the right to self-defense even when non-state actors such as terrorists are the 
perpetrators of armed aggression. Due to the highly unconventional way that  
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transnational terrorist organizations operate, this opinion may suggest that the ICJ 
acknowledges that self-defense may be employed preemptively and be legal at the same 
time.174  
4. Arguments against Preemption 
Critics of preemptive self-defense argue that it may not satisfy the Caroline test 
when a WMD threat is neither acute nor imminent as was the case in Iraq. According to 
Barry R. Schneider, the director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center, “ill-considered 
preemptive strikes could backfire catastrophically.”175 He argues that Iraq does not meet 
several of the guidelines necessary for the United States to take preemption as the only 
option. First, there were no clear indications as to the immediacy of the WMD threat. 
Second, a “kill-or-be-killed” situation warranting self-defense could not be clearly 
established.176 
The United States and the United Kingdom might have pursued further UN 
resolutions because they felt that their justification for war was not strong enough. 
Although the Bush administration claimed that there were no specific timelines given for 
invading Iraq, it appears that this was the intent of the administration all along. The fact 
that the Bush administration had as much time as it did in building up the case against 
Iraq itself does not justify the imminent aspect of the threat.  
Article 51 of the UN Charter explicitly requires the occurrence of an “armed 
attack” in order to justify use of force in self-defense.177 In that case, the Bush Doctrine 
may prove to be extremely problematic to international peace because it does not require 
any actual armed aggression. It becomes even more problematic when used in 
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conjunction with the One Percent Doctrine devised by then-Vice President Cheney, 
which foregoes thorough analyses and hard evidence.178 
Critics also argue that the war against Iraq was more about establishing a regime 
that is pro-democracy in the Middle East than about self-defense. Mary O’Connell argues 
that SCR 678 did not authorize the use of force to change Saddam’s regime 
specifically.179 According to Stanley Hoffman, the Bush Doctrine is “breathtakingly 
unrealistic” because it “proclaims the emancipation of a colossus from international 
constraints…In context it amounts to a doctrine of global domination.”180 John Ikenberry 
claims that the NSS is a manifestation of “neoimperial vision in which the United States 
arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force and 
meting out justice.”181  
It is also highly probable that there may be side effects originating from 
preemptive self-defense. According to Richard Gardner, the Bush Doctrine is 
unacceptable because it may “legitimize preemptive attacks by Arab countries against 
Israel, by China against Taiwan, by India against Pakistan, and by North Korea against 
South Korea…would even serve to legitimize ex post facto Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor.”182 Potential adversaries may in turn intensify their efforts in developing and 
transferring WMD to transnational terrorists for the purpose of self-defense against our 
preemptive self-defense. Such occurrences would result in a “downward spiral” in which 
preemptive self-defense begets preemptive self-defense.183 
Realists would also argue that strong states do what they must in order to ensure 
national security and that it did not matter much to the United States that the war against 
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Iraq lacked strong legal justifications. The fact that the war was prosecuted, despite heavy 
opposition by traditional allies and several members of the Security Council, suggests 
that legal justifications were sacrificed in the name of national security. 
Is the concept of preemptive self-defense still illegal after all arguments were 
weighed? Under current international law, preemptive self-defense may not satisfy 
legality in terms of the Caroline test. However, the world is constantly evolving. When 
the Caroline test was devised, no states had to face threats from WMD and transnational 
terrorists.184 WMD and transnational terrorists have changed the global security stage. 
International law now seems antiquated and impractical in contrast. International law, 
too, must evolve in order to reflect the current state of the world. In fact, international law 
is known to change as customary practices evolve over time.185 The ICJ and the UNSC 
need to employ a liberal interpretation of the use of force in order to remain relevant in 
the struggle by states against transnational terrorists. 
What is the right course of action for the United States then? The answer lies 
within what seems to be a paradoxical statement: A hegemonic state is only so in the 
presence of non-hegemons. In order for the United States to maintain and enjoy its 
hegemonic status, it needs the rest of the world. Therefore, the United States must 
become an integral part of the world. What would it mean to be a part of the world to the 
United States? When a state agrees to be a part of the world, it would also mean that it 
agrees to be subjected to the very law that governs the rest of the world. In practical 
terms, the United States must strive to do a better job of building cases for and 
prosecuting wars. When invoking “preemption” it must also be ready to be held 
accountable for accurate intelligence analyses that clearly established an “acute” or 
“imminent” threat. 
F.  SUMMARY 
The Arroyo administration’s active support for the second front has played a key 
role in restoring the once neglected U.S.-Philippines security cooperation. It is yet to be 
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seen whether the second front has had any impact on strengthening, or weakening, the 
democratic institution of the Philippines. On the other hand, it is clear that the efforts so 
far have not led the Philippines to strengthening security ties with other Southeast Asian 
countries. Furthermore, the GRP’s second front advocacy has had a negligible impact on 
effectively addressing the grievances and socio-politico-economic marginalization of the 
Moro population. 
According to Joseph Biden, “[t]he events of September 11 made it clear that our 
armed forces could not focus solely on traditional challenges-threats from traditional 
states with traditional military capabilities. This new world we have found ourselves in 
has compelled us to think in a very different way.”186 Reveron further argues that 
“[d]uring the Bush years, all engagement was justified on the basis of preventing 
terrorism by getting at root causes. However, as the loaded “global war on terrorism” 
language fades from the policy lexicon, activities will be centered on improving social 
conditions and sovereignty.”187 
In terms of combating terrorism more effectively, the United States must 
acknowledge that its allies, with respect to their regions, “are better positioned to handle a 
given problem because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture 
better than we [the United States military] do or ever could.”188 Also, the United States 
must find a way to practice prevention by way of comprehensive diplomatic strategy, and 
stop relying on preemption through military strategy. 
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IV. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Although identified as a critical spot in the global war on terrorism, the southern 
Philippines has not become a safe haven for transnational terrorist organizations as once 
feared. To date, the series of joint military operations by the United States and the AFP 
have targeted Islamic separatist organizations. However, the Islamic separatists’ goal of 
establishing political and territorial autonomy makes the ongoing military operations a 
way of treating the symptoms and not the causes.189  
Several attempts at peace negotiations have all but succeeded. The latest 
negotiations, which the belligerent parties agreed to settle, were struck down by the 
Philippine Supreme Court during its final hours prior to the signing. The two belligerent 
parties, that deadlocked in a zero-sum conflict highlight the need for an alternative way to 
settle their differences.  
This chapter investigates the possibility of reaching a satisfactory resolution of the 
conflict in the southern Philippines by way of third-party mediation involving a credible 
mediator, a common end state, and a fair process that both the Moros and Filipinos can 
agree upon. This chapter adopts the definition of conflict resolution by Oliver 
Ramsbotham et al for analyzing the Mindanao Conflict: 
Conflict resolution is a…comprehensive term which implies that the deep-
rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. This implies that 
behavior is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the 
structure of the conflict has been changed…the term is used to refer both 
to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes, and to the 
completion of the process.190 
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B.  RESOLVING CONFLICT 
In order to formulate and prescribe a solution to a problem, the problem must be 
identified first. This ensures the solution’s applicability and effectiveness in solving the 
problem. Therefore, this chapter begins by identifying the characteristics of the Mindanao 
Conflict.  
The Philippine society, in which the Mindanao Conflict and its actors dwell, 
exhibits all of the characteristics of a deeply divided society as described by John Paul 
Lederach. There are four distinctive “interactive factors” present in societies that are 
deeply divided: formation of security groups that are smaller than national citizenship, 
armed struggle between the groups for power, deep-rooted or “intractable” grievances, 
and limited “governmental mechanisms” to effectively deal with the conflict.191 In 
addition, the Mindanao Conflict fits the definition of civil war by Michael Doyle and 
Nicholas Sambanis:  
Civil war is an armed conflict that pits the government and national army 
of an internationally recognized state against one or more armed 
opposition groups able to mount effective resistance against the state; the 
violence must be significant, causing more than a thousand deaths in 
relatively continual fighting that takes place within the country’s 
boundaries; and the rebels must recruit mostly locally, controlling some 
part of the country’s territory.192  
Furthermore, the Mindanao Conflict can be categorized as an ethnopolitical 
conflict, “in which groups that define themselves using ethnic criteria make claims on 
behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other political actors.”193 
Therefore, for the purpose of the analysis, this thesis regards the Mindanao Conflict as an 
ethnopolitical civil war taking place within a deeply divided society. 
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The following sections of this chapter analyze the possibility of reaching a 
satisfactory resolution of the conflict through a common and realistic end state, mediated 
by a credible third-party mediator, and a fair process that all involved parties can agree 
upon. A satisfactory resolution agreed on by all will not only ensure success in achieving 
a short-term peace, but also contribute immensely to a long-term sustainable peace and 
stability. 
1. End State 
The characteristics of a deeply divided society pose enormous challenges to 
peace. When combined with “intractable” issues typically associated with an 
ethnopolitical conflict, the prospect for peace suddenly becomes remote even when all 
available resources have been committed. Indeed, historical data does indicate the 
tendency for ethnopolitical conflict to resist settlement more than any other type of 
war.194   
It is possible for the belligerent parties to commit considerable time and resources 
in a peace negotiation only to find out that each had envisioned a different scenario in a 
post-conflict environment. The Mindanao Conflict is deeply rooted in intractable issues 
such as ancestral domain, liberal democratic vs. Islamic political systems, and a national 
government that is unable to provide the development necessary to achieve the citizens’ 
desired quality of life.195 In order for the negotiated settlement to gain traction and 
ultimately succeed in the southern Philippines, the parties must be willing to 
accommodate each other’s different views and not blur the focus of a common end state 
at the end of a war, which this thesis defines as long-term sustainable peace and stability 
in the southern Philippines. Focusing all available resources and political—rather than 
military—efforts on the common end state will also maximize the chances of achieving 
peace.  
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2. Why Third-party Mediation?  
Over the course of the Mindanao Conflict, governments and political 
organizations have offered their services to mediate the peace process. Their efforts 
brought a varying degree of success in achieving peace. This section’s analysis relies on 
existing theories of mediation to determine the applicability and viability of third-party 
mediation in future peace negotiations. 
What appears to be common terminology such as “conflict” or “mediation” takes 
on a wide range of meanings when used in different settings. In order to alleviate the 
ensuing confusion, Ramsbotham defines mediation, for the purpose of conflict resolution, 
as a process that “involves the intervention of a third party; it is a voluntary process in 
which the parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), although it is 
sometimes combined with positive and negative inducements (mediation with 
muscle).”196 Others define mediation as “efforts by third parties to prevent the eruption 
or escalation of destructive conflict behavior and to facilitate a settlement that makes 
renewed destructive behavior and to facilitate a settlement that makes renewed 
destructive behavior unlikely.”197 Christopher Mitchell makes further argument that 
mediation is aligned closely with “peacemaking” and not “peace enforcement.”198 A 
mediation process is likely to be used to manage a prolonged conflict when peace 
negotiations have reached an impasse, there is an exhaustion of will and resources on 
both sides to continue hostilities, and the belligerent parties expressly welcome a form of 
mediation in order to overcome the impasse.199   
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According to Thania Paffenholz, mediation has a long history as an “instrument 
of peaceful conflict resolution.”200 Figure 8 shows the evolution of the way mediation is 
viewed and the level that it is handled. The state level (Track 1), the civil-society level 
(Track 2), and the complementary approaches all focus on eliminating the hostilities 
altogether. With the latest approach, which is known as the transformation approach, the 
focus has been shifted from eliminating the hostilities entirely to merely transforming 
them into a relatively low-level violence, thereby achieving a more manageable 
conflict.201  
 
Figure 8.   Development of Approaches to Mediation.202 
Recognizing the different phases of a conflict in the conflict cycle (Table 3) is 
extremely important in conflict resolution. This is because as the level of violence rises, 
the more powerful the mediator should be in order to bring credibility to carrying on with 
either military or financial threats in case of non-compliance by belligerent parties.203 In 
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addition, viewing the conflict through the conflict cycle offers “a wider range of 
possibilities for mediated interventions by a more inclusive set of actors and 
institutions.”204 The conflict cycle divides the life of a conflict into several different 
phases in terms of level of violence: low, rising, high, and declining. As the level of 
violence rises and a conflict reaches the “hurting stalemate,”205 so does the opportunity 
for the mediators to succeed. When taking into consideration the high level of violence in 
the southern Philippines, according to the conflict cycle table, the recommended type of 
third-party mediation is Track 1 diplomacy, which may be complemented by a limited 
application of Track 2. The recommended mediator should be of either international or 
regional organizations that have considerable power over the subject warring parties. The 
conflict cycle also does not rule out the possibility of employing eminent persons.   
 
Table 3.   Type of Third-Party Assistance and the Conflict Cycle.206 
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When selecting mediators for future peace processes, it is important to remember 
that the neutrality and impartiality of the mediators, as perceived by the belligerent 
parties, are crucial in a successful mediation.207 This is because neutrality and 
impartiality bring credibility to the mediators. As a result, mediators can more readily 
engage the parties and bring them to the negotiating table. 
There were times when the MILF trusted and reached out to the United States to 
play the mediator’s role in ending the hostilities in the southern Philippines. An example 
of such trust is MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim’s letter to President George W. Bush. In 
response to the letter, the United States asked the MILF to sever all ties to known terrorist 
organizations. When the MILF expressed its compliance208, the United States instead 
displayed a lack of confidence by communicating with them only through the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP), a non-governmental third-party. It is true that from 2003 
to 2007, the USIP worked closely with the MILF and built up trust, to a certain degree, 
through successful initiatives such as the Philippine Facilitation Project.209 Since then, 
however, the United States has involved itself deeply in actively supporting the GRP in 
both military and financial aspects, in addition to committing U.S. military personnel to 
AFP’s operations targeting the insurgency, which eliminates its opportunity to become a 
neutral and impartial mediator. From the policy perspective, it also makes sense for the 
United States to distance itself as the second front policy has, arguably, been interfering 
with the peace process. 
According to the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research, the GRP favors Malaysia as the mediator but may look to others for additional 
support. Their eminent persons list includes internationally recognized names such as 
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Tony Blair and Kofi Annan.210 Bercovitch argues that the position of the United Nations 
Secretary-General carries the potential to be an effective mediator. In addition, his role as 
a mediator has a legal basis in the Charter of the United Nations.211 The impartiality of 
the Secretary-General has been codified in Article 100 of the U.N. Charter: “…shall not 
seek or receive instructions from any government or from any authority external to the 
organization.”212 However, while the position of the U.N. Secretary-General carries the  
potential to be an effective mediator, it, too, has its limitations. Due to the questionable 
record of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the credibility of the UN to carry out the 
“stick” portion of the carrot and stick diplomacy may have been negatively impacted, 
thereby reducing its effectiveness as a mediator.    
As an eminent member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
Turkey occupies a unique position and may be another viable candidate. The OIC has 
expressed its commitment in the resolution of the Mindanao Conflict. Turkey’s interest in 
this peace talk seems to lie along the advancement of the interests of the fellow Muslims, 
or autonomy.213 The European Union has also shown an interest in becoming a mediator 
in order to get the peace negotiations moving again. The European Parliament even 
passed a resolution expressing its support for the GRP in the interest of moving the peace 
process along in the southern Philippines.214  
Once the appropriate third-party mediators have been identified, does it matter 
when the mediation process begins? Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly argue that the 
key to a successful mediation is “to intervene with the appropriate third party method at 
 
 
                                                 
210 International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), “Monthly Country 
Report, Philippines,” March, 2009, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Monthly%20Reports/Philippines-March09.pdf. 
211 Bercovitch, ed., 76–78. 
212 Charter of the United Nations (1945), http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. 
213 ICPVTR.  
214 Ibid.  
 61
the appropriate time.”215 Crocker et al further make the argument that depending on the 
situation, recognizing the right time to intervene is perhaps far more important than the 
selection of mediators itself.216 
The Mindanao Conflict is currently at a “high” level of violence with the conflict 
reaching a “hurting stalemate.” According to the Entry Points in the Conflict Cycle 
(Table 4), this signifies that the conflict has only a few numbers of potential entry points, 
relatively high barriers to entry, and a moderate to high opportunity to exercise 
procedural control. It also indicates that the mediators have limited room to maneuver in 
dealing with the belligerent parties that are less than willing to cooperate.  
 
Table 4.   Entry Points in the Conflict Cycle.217 
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Taking into consideration the current state of the Mindanao Conflict, the analysis 
points to the conclusion that third-party mediation is still a viable choice to intervene 
peacefully. The future mediators, however, must be keenly aware of the limitations 
imposed upon their procedural control, by the current state of the conflict, in order to 
maximize the success of intervention. 
3. Designing a Fair Process 
Ron Kraybill argues that “[p]eople and organizations are usually more sensitive 
about how a decision is reached than what the decision itself is.”218 The sensitivity 
manifests itself in the acceptance of an outcome if people perceive the process to be fair. 
On the other hand, if the process is perceived to be unfair, they will reject the outcome, 
no matter how good it may be. This theory becomes important in a mediation process 
where the acceptance of the outcome of a negotiation by all parties involved generally 
leads them to a resolution of hostilities.   
In the case of the Philippines, the GRP’s secretive process of drafting the MOA-
AD manifested into a sense of unfairness in the minds of the potentially affected Filipino 
population. Frustrated by the lack of available information about the draft MOA-AD, and 
more particularly how it may affect their interests in land ownership, North Cotabato 
Governor, Emmanuel Piñol, and Zamboanga City Mayor, Celso Lobregat, filed a petition 
asking the Supreme Court to force the GRP to disclose information. Mayor Lobregat 
argued that the GRP failed to disclose the details of the proposed MOA-AD to his city 
residents, denying them a fair opportunity to review and present their arguments to the 
draft. According to Iligan City officials, they were taken aback by “the lack of 
transparency in the negotiation process from which we, the local officials, and the 
residents of the city felt excluded and betrayed.”219       
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In order to help prevent such occurrences in the future, the process designers must 
undergo a careful planning involving all those who may potentially be affected by the 
outcome of the process, and distribute and educate the available information among them. 
More importantly, however, a “[g]ood process [must involve] key parties (or their 
representatives) not only in the process of negotiation and decisionmaking but in the 
design of the process itself.”220 
Another point that the designers of the mediation process must keep in mind is 
that the way the peace negotiation is designed now may have far-reaching consequences 
in terms of post-conflict security-building. Donald Rothchild argues that: 
In the context of a weak state environment at the time the peace 
negotiations take place as well as during the implementation process, the 
choice of grand design influences and reflects the balance of group power. 
The structuring of relations that occurs may involve a direct process of 
centrally imposed order or an indirect process of accommodating to the 
reality of decentralized power among autonomous actors, with different 
effects on the ruling coalition’s ability to craft its desired policy 
objectives.221 
There are two design approaches to security-building systems: individual and 
group-based. Each approach has its own unique set of challenges. Individual-based 
security-building systems are based on a majority rule through elections. Philip Roeder 
argues that “the most successful containment of ethnic conflict below the level of 
ethnoconstitutional crises has come from unitary states with extensive and inclusive civil 
liberties for individuals.” Founding elections, for example, are often used as a vehicle for 
building post-conflict institutions in unitary states. In the case of Mozambique, Afonso 
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electoral defeat and settled for a new role as a political opposition leader. However, fear 
of an uncertain future and distrust may drive minority leaders to look elsewhere for 
security.222  
Group-based security-building systems are initiated by the citizens’ “collective” 
insecurity and fear of the state’s inability to “protect and to provide for their well-being, 
[thereby enhancing] the importance of the identity group…” In such settings, ethnicity 
and religion play a relatively minor part, if any, in creating and exacerbating tensions. 
While effective in providing security to the minority or weaker groups, the group-based 
security-system may become a hindrance to the post-conflict government. The group 
members’ loyalty may split between the group and the new government. In situations 
where one must choose between the two, the choice may well be the group that the 
member shares more in common with than the government.223  
Regional autonomy is a type of the group-based security-building system in 
which “territorial autonomy” is used to protect minority interests in “political, social, and 
cultural functions at the regional level and thereby to allay their fears of majority 
domination and exploitation.”224 In the case of the Philippines, Rothchild further argues 
that the group-based system is actually becoming a hindrance to the peace process: 
In the short term at least, territorial decentralization can help to overcome 
group insecurity about the future by sending reassuring signals to minority 
interests about their autonomous powers for dealing with certain local 
matters. Because territorial decentralization can be formulated to 
accommodate well-entrenched and spatially separated identity groups, 
many people involved in crafting postsettlement designs viewed it as a 
useful institution-building mechanism. For example, political autonomy 
was the guiding principle underlying the 1996 agreement between the 
government of the Philippines and the Muslim secessionist Moro National 
Liberation Front; even so, the autonomy arrangement set up under this 
agreement is still not acceptable.225 
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Under such conditions, two possibilities emerge. The first is a political 
centralization in which power is consolidated to the central government. The other is a 
political decentralization where power is further diffused to the point of breaking up the 
state.226 By understanding the effects and consequences of both approaches, process 
designers can carefully balance the two and craft a mediation process that contributes to a 
longer-lasting peace and stability. 
The Philippines, as a unitary state, is not willing to concede the Moro’s complete 
independence as a separate people and nation. Regional autonomy, as a group-based 
system, appears to be the next logical step in the settlement process. The pre-designed 
peace process, based on the group-based system, may expedite the process of reaching a 
settlement. On the other hand, it will present serious challenges to sustaining peace in the 
long-term. Lack of transparency in the peace process and concern about uncertain 
security in a post-conflict environment will force the affected individuals to rely on 
group-based system in order to secure their future. The optimum solution in such a 
setting is to devise a transparent peace process that promotes individual participation and 
ensures maximum security, while accommodating their interests by way of individual—
rather than group—participation beginning with providing inputs to designing the peace 
process.    
C. ANALYSIS OF PAST MEDIATION EFFORTS 
The peace process between the GRP and the Islamic insurgency in the southern 
Philippines is largely made up of two distinctive negotiations: GRP-MNLF and GRP-
MILF. Each negotiation took place over a different period, independent from one 
another, and with different mediators. The results, however, were similar: protracted 
negotiation occasionally interrupted by armed hostilities, ineffective implementation of 
settlement terms, and unsustainable peace.  
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1. GRP-MNLF: OIC (1975–1996) 
Beginning in January 1975 and ending in September 1996, Soliman M. Santos, Jr. 
argues that the GRP-MNLF negotiation underwent three distinct phases, each under a 
different Filipino regime; Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos.227 The negotiation held under the 
Marcos regime resulted in the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976. This became a 
turning point for the Moros as they changed their position from a complete separation and 
independence to Muslim autonomy as an integral part of the Philippines. The Moros’ 
autonomy, however, was short lived. The impatient GRP unilaterally established 
autonomous governments in Central and Western Mindanao before the Moros could 
implement their own. Naturally, the MNLF strongly denied the legitimacy of the 
autonomous governments established by the GRP.  
The MNLF focused on mitigating the unusually strong unilateral tendency of the 
GRP during the next phase of the negotiation. The resulting Jeddah Accord on January 3, 
1987 enabled the creation of the ARMM, led and operated by the Moros.228 The last 
phase resulted in the Jakarta Accord on September 2, 1996, which contained a phased 
implementation plan for the Muslim autonomy.  
Throughout all three phases of the GRP-MNLF negotiation, the OIC served as the 
mediator. In preparation for embarking on the mediator’s journey, the OIC made clear its 
position with regard to the peace negotiation that the GRP must “find a political and 
peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly with the 
representatives of the MNLF…within the framework of the national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Philippines.”229 The OIC also recognized the MNLF as the only 
“legitimate” entity to represent the Moros. The preeminence and international recognition 
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of the OIC had contributed significantly to the resulting peace agreement within the 
prescribed framework: Moro autonomy while respecting the sovereignty and preserving 
the territorial integrity of the Philippines.  
Despite a successful negotiation and agreement, implementation became 
problematic. The MNLF became weary of the GRP’s unilaterally dictating the rushed 
pace of the phased implementation. The much-awaited economic and social 
improvements did not occur. Others stakeholders such as local Christians, Lumads, and 
even the Moros not represented by the MNLF, who felt marginalized by the peace 
negotiation between the government and the Moro representatives, did little to participate 
in the implementation.230 To make matters even worse, the Muslims and the GRP had 
lost confidence in Misuari’s leadership as the first governor of the ARMM. The Moros 
were drowning in despair caused by the continued marginalization, made worse by the 
sense of betrayal by one of their own.  
The involvement of the OIC continued during the implementation stage. The 
Quadripartite Ministerial Committee made up of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Senegal, and 
Somalia dispatched peace observers to monitor the effective implementation of the 
settlement terms. Indonesia, as a prominent OIC member and a fellow ASEAN country, 
also sent peace observers. Despite the efforts made by the OIC members, however, 
unarmed peace observers in small numbers could do little to nothing to prevent the 
recurrence of armed clashes between the GRP and the MNLF fighters. According to the 
OIC Secretary General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, “[the GRP-MNLF] peace process did not 
bring real peace. Disagreement on the interpretation of some provisions of the agreement 
led to the resumption of hostilities.”231      
The GRP-MNLF peace negotiation highlighted the fact that a successful 
settlement with all parties reaching a consensus does not conclude a peace process. The 
implementation of settlement terms is just as important as reaching a settlement in paving 
the way to a sustainable peace.  
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2. GRP- MILF: Malaysia (1996–2008) 
The GRP-MILF negotiation can be broken down further into two phases: 
domestic and diplomatic. The first phase began with a series of exploratory meetings as 
soon as the GRP-MNLF negotiation ended in 1996. The meetings progressed into low-
level preparatory negotiations, then to formal peace negotiations in 1999. After a brief 
suspension from 2000 to 2001 due to the GRP’s “all-out war” policy, the talks resumed 
with Malaysia at the helm as the official third-party facilitator.232  
Malaysia began its involvement strictly as a facilitator. Over the course of the 
peace negotiations, its involvement increased dramatically to the point of becoming a 
mediator. The main difference between the two positions was that the former took on a 
role much like a referee, while the latter a coach advising the participants when the 
negotiation process became stagnant. Indeed, Malaysia had not been shy about 
emphasizing its philosophy on the importance of economic development above other 
development possibilities.233  
Both the GRP and the MILF negotiators approved Malaysia’s effective role of 
then-facilitator/now-mediator. When the GRP and the MILF reached an impasse, and 
armed hostilities broke off in 2001, it resulted in several of the MILF camps being 
captured by the AFP, shuttling diplomacy of Malaysia played a key role in bringing them 
back to the negotiation table. In 2003, hostilities broke off again. This time, Malaysia 
engaged in exploratory talks with each of them and successfully brought them back to 
peace negotiations. The fact that they were able to reach a settlement, despite persistent 
armed hostilities and frequent suspensions leading to the protracted peace process, is a 
testament to Malaysia’s effectiveness as a facilitator and the International Monitoring 
Team’s commitment to monitoring and reducing hostilities during the peace process.234        
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Unfortunately, as with the previous negotiations, a successful conclusion is not a 
sure formula that yields a lasting peace. Lack of consultation and exclusion in the peace 
process caused both the Moro and non-Moro parties, other than MILF, to boycott the 
peace settlement. The peace process halted right before the GRP and the MILF 
negotiators signed the settlement.    
3. Extreme Protraction, Incoherent Peace Policy and the GWOT 
What is unique about the Philippines case is the “extreme protraction of the peace 
process.”235 The GRP-MNLF process took twenty-one years and the GRP-MILF twelve 
years to conclude. Miriam Coronel Ferrer points to the “incoherent [GRP] peace policy 
and absence of peace-building leadership” from both GRP and MILF/MNLF contributed 
to the protraction.236  
While working on identifying the MILF camps during the ceasefire, in order to 
delineate the organization’s sphere of influence, the GRP discovered far more camps than 
it originally anticipated. Alarmed by the significant MILF presence, the Estrada regime 
completely reversed its policy of peace to “all-out war” on the MILF. The then-National 
Security Adviser Alexander Aguirre justified the change in policy: “Any responsible and 
self-respecting government would not allow rebels to…overpower duly-elected local 
civilian governments….We cannot close our eyes to the armed challenges of the rebels to 
the Constitutional order, or let the rebels continue victimizing our people through 
terrorism and other illegal acts.”237 In response to the AFP’s attacks on its camps, 
including Camp Abubakar, the MILF’s epicenter of political, military, and religious 
activities, the MILF declared jihad. The “all-out war” policy resulted in the AFP 
capturing the majority of the MILF camps as well as a suspension of the peace 
process.238 
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The Arroyo administration that replaced Estrada took a different approach to the 
peace process. Constantly battling fraud accusations and coup attempts, the 
administration was also engaged in the peace process with its “all-out peace” policy. 
While admirable in spirit, the GRP’s own internal dynamics made the policy’s 
implementation difficult. The GRP engaged in peace talks with the MILF through the 
official panel. At the same time, it engaged in a back-channel negotiation with the MILF. 
The apparent lack of coordination between the two resulted in two completely different 
proposals: the official panel favored an elaborate developmental model while the back-
channel favored an NGO-led and operated development. When each began negotiating 
with the MILF on its own terms, frustrated President Arroyo had no choice but to relieve 
the official peace panel.239   
The critics of Arroyo’s peace policy argue that its lack of coherence disrupts the 
peace process: while advocating an “institutional peace-building” approach, the actual 
peace policy has been leaning towards “pacification” and “military victory.” In 2003, the 
AFP conducted a military offensive on the Buliok Complex, causing a suspension of the 
talks. One of the objectives was to capture MILF Chairman Hashim. The offensive 
resulted in hundreds dead, thousands wounded, and hundreds of thousands of IDPs, and it 
suspended the peace negotiations once again.240 The argument goes even further by 
saying that the peace policy is fueled by the U.S. policy of the second front in the 
GWOT, when in actuality, its implementation was strictly intended for the ASG.241 This 
militarist mentality originated from the profound influence the AFP has had with the 
GRP at the policy level throughout modern Philippine history. Even before Arroyo came 
into power, and the second front policy came into play, the GRP and the AFP had already 
exhibited a tendency to rely heavily on its military strength to subdue the “rebels” in the 
battlefields in order to gain a favorable position at the negotiation table.   
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On the surface, the highly militarized second front policy stands in the way to 
peace. Or is that really the case? The International Crisis Group argues quite the reverse 
is true that the peace process is getting in the way of achieving peace through a military 
victory: “the southern Philippines peace process…presents the main short-term obstacle 
to rooting out the terrorist network, and an indispensable element in any long-term 
remedy…[g]enuine and fully implemented autonomy for Philippine Muslim is a sine qua 
non for winning the long-term war on terror in Mindanao.”242 The considerable success 
the militaristic approach has brought in reducing the ASG terrorist threats and capturing 
the MILF camps further strengthen the argument. 
The problem with this approach is that it becomes much easier to lose focus on 
the root causes for the conflict, which is the real key to solving the insurgency and 
achieving sustainable peace. Kinetic operations produce relatively quick results in 
tangible numbers, which in turn enable policy-makers to successfully argue for increased 
support for the military approach. In the long-term, however, such moves can not only 
suspend the peace process but also actually reverse what little gain has been achieved.         
The extreme protraction of the peace process in the southern Philippines has not 
contributed positively to achieving a sustainable peace, prompting a need for an alternate 
approach. An approach leaning towards peaceful measures, supplemented by military 
measures to deal with the extreme hardliners, is a viable option to a lasting peace.  
D.  SUMMARY 
As a major non-NATO ally to the United States, peace and stability in the 
Philippines is of utmost importance to U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia. Without a 
lasting peace in the southern Philippines, the GRP will find itself in a perpetual loop of 
armed hostilities for an indefinite period. The Mindanao Conflict has drained the GRP’s  
limited resources, which could otherwise be redirected elsewhere for public welfare and 
development.  
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In terms of mediation, the United States must exercise extreme caution and 
maintain a low-key posture since it has indirectly become a party to the conflict by 
providing both military and financial aid to the GRP. By advocating a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict instead of a militaristic approach and counter-terrorism rhetoric, the United 
States will not only demonstrate to the Southeast Asians its good will, but also the fact 
that Americans are firmly committed to a lasting peace and stability in the Philippines 
and throughout the region. 
Recognizing the right timing to intervene in the conflict cycle enables process 
designers to choose the right mix of the types of approaches and third-party mediators 
that will contribute positively towards maximizing the chance of resolving the conflict. 
Third-party monitoring of the ceasefire agreement and following through with the peace 
implementation during the post-negotiation phase, is just as important in the effort to 
increase the chances for lasting peace and stability. Analysis of the past third-party 
mediations revealed that in the southern Philippines, effective oversight and monitoring 
during the implementation phase is the missing link that can extrapolate a sustaining 
peace from the peace settlement process. Also left desired is the inclusion of parties other 
than the GRP and the MILF. There are others, both Moros and non-Moros that are not 
part of the MILF organization, whose lives will be equally impacted by the peace 
process. They must have the buy-in in the peace process and settlement terms in order to 






V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis in the preceding chapters of this thesis allows us to draw the 
following conclusions. First, the Mindanao Conflict might have originated from either 
ethnic or religious grievances, but over the course of its life, the conflict has evolved into 
a distinctively ethnopolitical civil war. The current politics of Islamic insurgents originate 
from “a profound sense of humiliation and subordination at the hands of the western 
colonial powers, combined with a rejection of secular western commercial culture, which 
is seen to threaten Islamic values.”243 Therefore, the Islamic separatists’ goal is to 
establish an independent state, which is deeply rooted in Islamic principles. In such a 
climate, the kinetic approach in dealing with terrorism results in a visible short-term gain 
for a specific and isolated instance. However, the long-term results will be counter-
productive.  
Second, the latest breakdown of the peace negotiations between the GRP and the 
MILF points more specifically to the grievances over the Moros’ loss of ancestral land 
and political marginalization as the root causes of the current conflict. The lack of trust 
between the GRP and the MILF causes a protracted peace process with little to no 
progress on the real issues that are the keys to lasting peace. The mistrust mainly stems 
from the GRP’s constantly shifting policies and its inability to abide by the agreed 
settlement terms. The MILF also plays a part by fostering a climate of mistrust. The lack 
of a strong leadership allows small factions within the MILF organization to engage in 
activities that are not sanctioned by the organization’s leadership, such as supporting 
transnational terrorists and engaging in armed hostilities with the AFP. Both 
organizations must work hard to regain trust in order for the peace talks to produce any 
meaningful results. At the same time, the GRP and the MILF must strive to build a 
national consensus on the urgent need for lasting peace. The consensus must come from 
across the nation at all levels. 
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Third, since its inception in 2002, the second front policy with an emphasis on the 
direct approach has been producing tangible results in terms of military metrics. 
However, the resilience of the insurgency indicates the ineffectiveness of the second front 
policy in addressing the root problems of the conflict. The second front policy, as it 
stands, is merely a measure of peacekeeping as “containment” of terrorist threats in the 
southern Philippines. Its current gravitation towards the direct approach to the problem 
will not result in a solution to the differential treatment and living conditions of the Moro 
people. At the same time, it may even risk furthering their grievances. In terms of the 
peace negotiation between the GRP and the MILF, the second front as a counter-
terrorism policy is overshadowing and dictating the direction of the GRP’s approach. 
While pro-peacebuilding in appearance, the GRP has allowed the counter-terrorism 
policy, which relies heavily on a military victory to dictate its peace policy.  
Fourth, in order to achieve its ultimate goal of eliminating a possible terrorist 
haven in the southern Philippines, the second front policy must gravitate towards the 
indirect approach. Intervention, in the form of an indirect approach, has been producing 
favorable results by addressing the root causes of the current conflict. The GRP and the 
United States need to exploit it to their advantage. In addition to stepping up the current 
indirect efforts, enlisting a third-party intervention will multiply the peace efforts and 
speed up the negotiations leading to a sustainable peace. Terrorism in the southern 
Philippines predates transnational terrorist threats and has no indication of turning into 
one. It is a political problem with a domestic agenda, which requires a political solution. 
Therefore, the involved parties must strive to find a political solution to resolve the 
ongoing conflict. The goal is not to eliminate all terrorists who commit acts of terrorism. 
The parties must instead shift their focus to eliminating the cause of terrorism. This will 
allow each side of the conflict to open up a dialogue instead of demonizing each other. 
Certain political accommodations previously thought impossible will now need to be 
made in order to achieve the common goal of sustainable peace.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Policy  
A comprehensive conflict resolution policy, which includes provisions for all 
levels of the society from the local level up, in addition to the current kinetic approach, is 
an attractive alternative to the current second front policy, which relies heavily on the 
kinetic approach. Such a policy will synchronize all the peace efforts with respect to 
foreign military and economic aid, as well as local and national politics.      
In terms of combating terrorists such as the ASG, the AFP must take the lead role. 
A direct approach may be effective in curtailing violent uprising and a rise in terrorist 
activities. However, it has a tendency to increase grievances. The public will not 
distinguish the presence of a military “observer” from a military “operator” in tactical 
situations. Therefore, U.S. military personnel must refrain from presenting an aggressive 
posture in both public appearances and in military operations, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood of elevating the grievances of the cause of transnational terrorists.  
The GRP must establish and abide by a coherent peace policy that is independent 
of the counter-terrorism policy. A coherent peace policy will bring credibility to the GRP 
during peace negotiations. The peace policy must have a buy-in from local and national 
as well as regional level actors such as the ASEAN. The buy-in at all levels will 
minimize the presence of spoilers and ensure the policy’s support and successful 
implementation at the local level. 
2.  Peace Negotiation  
The United States should consider taking a more active role in the peace process 
at the same time it should strive to reduce its footprints in tactical military operations. It 
must find a way to leverage its hegemonic power and influence to build confidence 
and/or coerce the GRP and the MILF to help expedite the peace agreement and ensure 
prompt and strict adherence to the implementation of peace settlement terms.  
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The GRP must re-engage in peace negotiations immediately and actively pursue a 
third-party mediator recognized and accepted by all in order to demonstrate a firm 
commitment to resolving the issue politically. Third party negotiations will bring an 
increased legitimacy and cooperation to the peace process. In addition, the GRP must be 
proactive in building a consensus and demonstrate its commitment to peace at all levels 
of the society. It will contribute to energized dynamics and attitudes in the approach to 
the negotiation table by all parties involved. 
3.  Future Studies  
While recognizing the importance of the role that economic assistance plays in 
building peace, this thesis focused on the military, political, diplomatic, and legal 
perspectives. Therefore, the author recommends a study in assessing and formulating 
economic assistance via the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF).244  
There have been several peace initiatives by civil society organizations in the 
southern Philippines. The author also recommends a study of multitrack efforts that 
include the NGO/donor communities in peace-building efforts. These efforts will 
complement the current Track 1 and Track 2 efforts. The result will contribute to 
developing and fine-tuning the peace-building approach that will contribute to a 
sustaining peace. 
The United States has been actively involved in the conflict and committed to 
resolving the conflict. Its commitment is equally matched by the member states of the 
OIC and the ASEAN. However, this thesis has not ruled out the possibility of the United 
Nations peace operation, thus remaining a viable option for achieving and sustaining 
peace. Therefore, the author recommends a study investigating the feasibility of the 
United Nations involvement.   
 
                                                 
244 Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Social Development Department, “The Conflict 
Analysis Framework (CAF): Identifying Conflict-related Obstacles to Development,” Social Development 
Department Dissemination Notes, no. 5, October 2002: 1–4.  
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This thesis attempted to analyze the second front policy from the international law 
perspective. The second front policy, which in essence, is an application of hegemonic 
power to enforce the will of one nation on another nation within the international system. 
The attempt, however, remains meager at best. The United States, as we all know, is a 
nation ruled by law. One of the sources for its legitimacy is its consistency in abiding by 
law. Therefore, given the importance of the subject, the author recommends further study 
to determine the legality of such an application of power within the framework of the 
international legal system.  
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